Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

# Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 087365
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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, UN, UR

SUBJECT: PEACEKEEPING GUIDELINES NEGOTIATIONS

REF: USUN 1055

1. SUBJECT TO COMMENTS BELOW, WE CONCUR GENERALLY WITH MISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WORDING OF REMAINING EIGHT GUIDELINES THAT WILL BE CONSIDERED BY PEACEKEEPING COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP DURING NEXT THREE WEEKS. SOME POSSIBLE VARIATIONS FOR THESE GUIDELINES ARE DISCUSSED IN PARA 4 BELOW, FOLLOWED BY OUR COMMENTS ON THE REMAINING
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PAGE 02 STATE 087365

PROBLEMS RELATING TO ARTICLE 1.

2. IT MAY FIRST BE USEFUL TO OUTLINE OUR GENERAL APPROACH TO THIS YEAR'S PEACEKEEPING NEGOTIATIONS. FOLLOWING UNEXPECTED SOVIET CONCESSIONS LAST FALL ON SOME MAJOR ISSUES (NOTABLY AGREEMENT TO A CONSULTATIVE, RATHER THAN EXECUTIVE, SUBSIDIARY SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE,) THERE

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

WOULD APPEAR TO BE A REASONABLE CHANCE OF CONCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS THIS YEAR ON TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US. THE NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER AGREED GUIDELINES ARE IN THE US INTEREST. CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE EFFECTIVELY RUN WITH NO GUIDELINES OTHER THAN THEIR INDIVIDUAL MANDATES APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IT IS ARGUABLE THAT AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS ARE PREFERABLE TO PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD RESTRICT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S

LATITUDE. IF THERE WERE NO UN PEACEKEEPING COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH DEVELOPING GUIDELINES, THIS ARGUMENT WOULD BE COMPELLING. AS IT IS, THE COMMITTEE EXISTS AND, AS WE LEARNED TWO YEARS AGO, CANNOT BE DISSOLVED. THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN GUIDELINES BEFORE AGREEING TO DISSOLVE OR SLOW DOWN THE COMMITTEE, AND THEIR THRUST WOULD BE ON TRANS-FERRING AUTHORITY FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE GENERAL ASS-EMBLY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NON-ALIGNED CANNOT CONTROL THE COUNCIL (EVEN IF THEY COULD ASSERT CONTROL OVER THE PEACEKEEPING COMMITTEE), AND GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE UNGA BUT NOT SUPPORTED BY SC WOULD BE OF UNCERTAIN EFFECT AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE MAIN CONSIDERATION IS PERMITTING AND PROMOTING EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS,APPRO-PRIATELY CONTROLLED.

3. THERE ARE SEVERAL ADDITIONAL REASONS WHY AGREEMENT THIS YEAR IS DESIRABLE IF IT CAN BE REACHED WITHOUT MATERIALLY RESTRICTING THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S AUTHORITY. (IN THIS REGARD, URQUHART
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AND SHERRY OF SECRETARIAT, WHILE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE EXERCISE, SEE NO THREAT TO THE EFFECTIVE CON-DUCT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN EITHER THE GUIDELINES THAT HAVE BEEN AGREED OR IN THOSE LIKELY TO EMERGE.) OTHER ADVANTAGES THAT WE SEE TO COMPLETING GUIDELINES ARE: A) DEMONSTRATINGTO THE USSR OUR WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOWARDS AGREEMENT IN AREAS WHERE OUR INTERESTS ARE NOT INCONSISTENT OR WHERE IRRITANTS TO IMPROVED RELATIONS CAN BE REMOVED, PARTICULARLY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET CON-CESSIONS; B) GIVING A PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST TO UN PEACEKEEPING BY TERMINATING - AT LEAST SYMBOLICALLY - THE PROTRACTED COLD WAR DISPUTE OVER PEACEKEEPING AUTHORITY; AND C) THROUGH GA ENDORSEMENT, ENHANCING THE STATUS OF A DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE SC AND SYG THAT WILL BE, WE HOPE, BOTH WORKABLE AND IN OUR INTEREST.

4. SPECIFIC COMMENTS FOLLOW ON POSSIBLE LANGUAGE FOR EIGHT UNAGREED ARTICLES:

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

A) ARTICLE 5: AGREE WITH MISSION THAT BROADENED LANGUAGE SHOULD REMAIN IF POSSIBLE; HOWEVER ITS OMISSION WOULD NOT PRECLUDE INVITING SYG TO ADDRESS A MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE IF THAT WERE CONSIDERED USEFUL.

B) ARTICLE 6: THIS ARTICLE, ON THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF SYG, IS THE MOST IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED GUIDELINE. AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO STAND OR FALL ON WHETHER AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION CAN BE DEVELOPED. PRESENT SOVIET LANGUAGE (OPTION 2 IN A/31/337) IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH USUN'S REFORMULATION OF OPTION 3, EXCEPT THAT WE QUESTION WHETHER INCLUSION OF THE "COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF" CONCEPT ADDS ANYTHING OR IS REALLY DESCRIPTIVE OF THE SYG'S ROLE. MORE IMPORTANT, IN OUR VIEW, IS AN UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT THAT THE SYG "DIRECTS" PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SC. IN LIGHT OF ARTICLE 1(8), WHICH STATES THAT ONE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 087365

SC RESPONSIBILITY IS "ULTIMATE DIRECTION AND CONTROL DURING THE OPERATION", IT WOULD SEEM USEFUL TO STATE EXPLICITLY THAT THE SYG "DIRECTS" OPERATIONS, I.E., HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMMEDIATE, DAY-TO-DAY DIRECTION AND CONTROL. THUS, WHILE WE FIND OPTION 1 OF ARTICLE 6 ACCEPTABLE AS IT STANDS, WE WOULD PREFER TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST SENTENCE WITH "THE SECRETARY GENERAL SHALL DIRECT UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS," INSTEAD OF "...SHALL BE THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF...."

C) ARTICLE 7: AGREE THAT OPTION 2 IS ACCEPTABLE, PREFERABLY WITH "FOR THAT PURPOSE" DELETED.

D) ARTICLE 8: OPTION 1 IS UNACCEPTABLE. OPTION 2 WOULD BE PREFERABLE WITH THE SECOND BRACKETED PHRASE, "WITH THE CONSENT," AS THIS COULD BE CONSTRUED AS FAILURE TO OBJECT OR REACT TO SYG'S REPORT TO SC THAT HE PLANS TO DESIGNATE A CERTAIN COMMANDER AND, AS USUN NOTES, THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT PRACTICE.

E) ARTICLE 9: IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ADD "IMPARTIA-LITY" OR "OBJECTIVITY" AS ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF PEACEKEEPING. THIS COULD BE DONE IN EITHER THE FIRST OR THIRD OPTIONS, THOUGH THE FIRST OPTION IS CLEARLY PREFERABLE. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THIRD OPTIONS IS MATERIAL. UNDER FIRST IF SC HAS TAKEN A DECISION, ARGUABLY A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MAY ACT IN FULL ACCORD WITH IT EVEN IF A PERMANENT MEMBER BACKS OFF (AS IN CONGO). BUT OPTION 3 GIVES EXPLICIT, IF ONLY "DUE," WEIGHT TO OPINIONS OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS AND THUS INVITES SOVIET INTERRUPTION OF ONGOING

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

OPERATIONS. WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO ACCEPT OPTION 3 FOR
THIS REASON. OPTION 2 IS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE. (FOR
THAT MATTER, OPTION 1 WOULD BE GREATLY IMPROVED BY RE-
WORDING FIRST SENTENCE TO READ "UNITED NATIONS PEACE-
KEEPING FORCES SHALL TO BE FULLY EFFECTIVE, MEET THREE
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PAGE 05 STATE 087365

ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS."

F) ARTICLE 10: OPTION 2 WAS SUBMITTED BY THE US,
AND ACCORDINGLY REFLECTS OUR DOCTRINE. IT WOULD BE BETTER
STILL IF "OBJECTIVITY" OR "IMPARTIALITY" COULD BE INSERTED
BETWEEN "COMPETENCE"AND "INTEGRITY." OPTION 1 SHOULD
NOT BE ACCEPTED ASBASISFOR NEGOTIATION UNLESS OTHER
CRITERIA FOR COMPOSITION (E.G., EFFICIENCY, OBJECTIVITY)

ARE INCLUDED IN ADDITION TO "BALANCED GEOGRAPHICAL
DISTRIBUTION."

G) ARTICLES 11-13: CONCUR FULLY WITH MISSION'S
VIEWS. WE ASSUME, IN ARTICLE 11, THAT PHRASE "WHICH THE
SECURITY COUNCIL MAY DECIDE" WILL BE OMITTED. ALSO
SUGGEST IN DISCUSSING ARTICLE 11 THAT YOU POINTED OUT THAT
ARTICLE 1(5) IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 11'S DES-
CRIPTION OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THAT ARTICLE 1
(5) MIGHT BETTER READ "RECOMMENDED FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS."
IN ARTICLE 12, OPTION 2, WE PREFER TO OMIT PHRASE REFERRING
TO SC.

5. AS FOR ARTICLE I, WE BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE TO RETAIN THE
BRACKETS AROUND THE INTRODUCTORY SENTENCE UNTIL FURTHER
AGREEMENT IS REACHED. OUR POSSIBLE ACCEPTANCE OF THAT
SENTENCE (OR A VARIANT OF IT) IS PROBABLY THE BEST
LEVERAGE WE HAVE TO DEVELOP AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULATION
FOR ARTICLE VI. FYI OUR PREFERRED RENDERING OF ARTICLE
I IS: "THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS PRIMARY AUTHORITY OVER
THE AUTHORIZATION, ULTIMATE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS." IF "PRIMARY" WERE UNOBTAINABLE,
WE WOULD WISH AT LEAST TO DELETE "THE" BEFORE "AUTHORITY."
END FYI FURTHERMORE, WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE IT IS
IN OUR INTERESTS TO ELABORATE FURTHER THE SPECIFIC
SC RESPONSIBILITIES SET FORTH IN ARTICLE I. TO DO SO
WOULD TEND TO RIGIDIFY THE GUIDELINES AND, MORE IMPORTANT,
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PAGE 06 STATE 087365

CREATE AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE GENERALITY OF THE GUIDE-

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

LINE ON THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE DETAILED NATURE OF THE SC GUIDELINE.

6. MISSION SHOULD" AS IN PAST, CONSULT WITH UK, CANADIAN AND JAPANESE DELEGATIONS, DRAWING ON ABOVE GENERAL AND SPECIFIC COMMENTS AS APPROPRIATE. FOLLOWING THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE WOULD WELCOME MISSION'S VIEWS AS TO WHETHER (AND WHERE) IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONSULT WITH USSR. BELIEVE THAT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL ALSO TO CONSULT USYG BUFFUM INFORMALLY, ELICITING HIS VIEWS TOWARD OUR APPROACH BUT MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT ASKING HIM TO BECOME INVOLVED.

7. BELIEVE OUR GENERAL NEGOTIATING STRATEGY SHOULD BE TO FURTHER AGREEMENT BUT NOT APPEAR TO BE OVERLY ANXIOUS OR NECESSARILY COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING AGREEMENT AT THIS ROUND UNLESS IT CAN BE OBTAINED ON BASIS OUTLINED ABOVE WITH MINIMAL ADAPTATIONS.

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# Message Attributes

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